by Mark Bauman | Aug 20, 2012 | Medical Malpractice, Philadelphia, Successes
Heather Hansen secured a defense verdict in favor of an emergency medicine physician following an eight day jury trial in Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania.
The patient was 18 years of age and the lawsuit was brought by his father. The patient had a history of passing out with exertion which was previously worked up by pediatric cardiologists and no further treatment was recommended. In 2007, the patient was playing football when he experienced chest pain and shortness of breath. He was taken to a local emergency room, and the emergency medicine physician consulted trauma and cardiology within minutes of his arrival. EKG’s were obtained and were abnormal. He was seen by cardiology and was in the process of being admitted to the CCU when he passed away from a rare cardiac defect. Specifically, the cause of death was an anomalous origin of the left coronary artery.
The plaintiff’s expert witnesses alleged that the emergency medicine physician was responsible for all of the care since he was still in the emergency room, despite being in the process of being admitted to the CCU. Plaintiff’s experts also alleged that other medications should have been given, the attending cardiologist should have been called, and the patient should have been taken to the catheterization lab. The documentation and medical care provided by the cardiology staff was also criticized. Plaintiff had claims for wrongful death and survival, including a claim for lost earnings.
The defense was that the emergency medicine physician obtained the appropriate consultations in an extremely timely and appropriate manner, and provided treatment that was appropriate. It was not the standard of care for an emergency medicine physician to take such patients to the catheterization lab, and evidence was presented that his death could not have been prevented due to his rare cardiac defect. The jury determined that the emergency medicine physician was not negligent.
by Mark Bauman | Aug 16, 2012 | Medical Malpractice, Philadelphia, Successes
Michael O. Pitt and Brett M. Littman obtained a defense verdict in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas on behalf of a family practice physician in a medical malpractice action. The plaintiff presented to the defendant-physician on several occasions between May 2008 and February 2009 with complaints, which included sore throat and reflux symptoms, for which she was treated with medications to reduce acid reflux.
In February 2009, the plaintiff again presented to the defendant-physician with now-constant throat pain, and the defendant-physician referred her to an ENT specialist. Upon visiting this specialist, the plaintiff was diagnosed with cancer of the supraglottic larynx in February of 2009, for which she was successfully treated.
The plaintiff contended that the physician failed to send her for a consult with an ENT physician sooner. The defense presented extensive expert testimony to the jury that the physician appropriately treated the patient’s complaints at each appointment and ordered a consult when appropriate. Additionally, the defense presented expert testimony to the jury that the patient has been cancer-free for nearly three years, and that her prognosis for the future is excellent.
After a short deliberation, the jury found that the physician complied with the standard of care and was not negligent.
by Mark Bauman | Aug 16, 2012 | Chester County, Commercial Liability / Litigation, Successes
Paul E. Peel and Brett M. Littman obtained a defense verdict in a bench trial at the Chester County Court of Common Pleas in a corporate liability action, which included allegations of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. Mr. Peel and Mr. Littman represented the president of an emergency medicine practice who was being sued by a former officer of the group.
In 2003, several emergency physicians at a local hospital made the decision to form an independent group who would share equally in profits obtained from their practice and have autonomy over the day-to-day operations of their practice. During the same time period, this group was approached by an existing group who operated at another hospital with a plan to combine the two practices, which would afford them certain benefits, including a discount from vendors and an increase in reimbursements from insurance companies for medical services rendered.
After initial discussions, the groups sought legal counsel and determined that the only way to obtain these benefits would be for the existing group to have a 100% ownership interest in the new group. All involved in the fledgling group agreed that the benefits of being owned greatly outweighed the need for complete autonomy, particularly when they would still control the day-to-day functioning of the practice. The members of the group voted, by a four-to-one count, to go forward with the plan. The dissenting voter nonetheless acquiesced to the plan, and the new group signed a contract to provide emergency services.
This dissenting voter became increasingly dissatisfied with the operation of the business and was demoted from his position as a corporate officer and co-owner of the new practice. He was ultimately terminated, and he brought a lawsuit against the president of the new group, the group itself, the group that held the ownership interest, and the group’s attorney. Plaintiff’s claims included allegations that the president of his group defrauded him and breached a fiduciary duty by concealing the fact that the new group would be owned by the existing practice, to his detriment.
By introducing corporate minutes, corporate start-up documentation, and the testimony of all involved, the defense presented extensive evidence that all parties were aware of the ownership structure before it went into effect, and that all members of the new group knew that they were to be owned by another group. After hearing the evidence and argument of the parties, the Honorable Edward Griffith rendered a defense verdict.
In the same action, Mr. Peel and Mr. Littman also represented the group’s healthcare attorney, as the plaintiff alleged that the attorney placed the interests of the group ahead of his personal interests, which represented a legal conflict and constituted legal malpractice. This action was dismissed pursuant to successful preliminary objections prior to trial.
Mr. Peel and Mr. Littman also represented the fledgling group and the group that held the ownership interest. Claims against these parties were also dismissed pursuant to successful preliminary objections prior to trial.
by Mark Bauman | Aug 16, 2012 | Bucks County, Medical Malpractice, Successes
Daniel F. Ryan, III and Brett M. Littman obtained a defense verdict in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas on behalf of an emergency department physician in a medical malpractice action.
In November 2002, the plaintiff presented to the emergency department with neurological complaints, including right-sided weakness and difficulty with speech. The defendant-physician ordered diagnostic tests and lab studies to determine the cause of the symptoms and, with the help of consulting neurologists, formulated a treatment plan.
The plaintiff contended that the physician failed to administer tPA, a “clot-busting” medication. According to the plaintiffs, this medication would have prevented the development of a stroke, which he ultimately suffered and which left him with significant disabilities.
The defense presented extensive expert testimony to the jury that the plaintiff was absolutely not a candidate to receive tPA, given his presentation, which included rapidly improving symptoms. These symptoms occurred, resolved, and then re-occurred. The defense also explained that emergency physicians often rely on consultations with specialists, such as neurologists, and that the defendant was justified in relying on the expertise of consultants in order to establish a treatment plan.
After a short deliberation, the jury found that the physician complied with the standard of care and was not negligent.
by Mark Bauman | Aug 16, 2012 | Legal Malpractice, Other Venues, Successes
UPDATE: Third Circuit Upholds Grant of Summary Judgment on Appeal
Following the events described below, the legal malpractice insurer filed an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the Firm’s client on the basis that he was not a joint tortfeasor with the third attorney, who allowed a default judgment to be entered.
Oral argument was conducted by Dan Ryan. You can read coverage of the argument by The Legal Intelligencer HERE.
In its opinion, the court held that it was appropriate to apply the multifactor test to determine whether the Firm’s client and the third attorney were joint tortfeasors. The court found that the two attorneys owed different duties to the business owners and years passed between their actions. Finally, the court found that the default judgment may have been a direct result of the actions of the Firm’s client, but it was caused solely by the actions of the third attorney. Therefore, the two attorneys did not cause a single, unapportionable injury to the business owners and the two attorneys were not jointortfeasors.
Since this determination alone was sufficient to affirm Judge Tucker’s grant of summary judgment, the Third Circuit did not reach the question of whether the Firm’s client was a proximate cause of any harm to the business owners.
Marshall L. Schwartz obtained summary judgment in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on behalf of an attorney in a legal malpractice case. The Firm’s client had represented business owners in a Bucks County township whose application for an occupancy permit was denied. The business owners felt that the permit was denied for improper reasons and sought to bring suit against the township and certain township officials. The Firm’s client prepared a complaint with RICO and civil rights causes of action but declined to continue with his representation of the business owners. The business owners filed the complaint pro se.
The business owners then retained a second attorney to pursue the federal action. The federal action was eventually dismissed. Three township officials then sued the business owners under the Dragonetti Act, alleging wrongful use of civil proceedings. A third attorney was retained to defend the business owners. However, he failed to file an answer to the Dragonetti Act complaint and a default judgment was taken.
Liability having been admitted through the default judgment, a trial on damages returned a verdict of $3,030,000 against the business owners. The business owners then sued their third attorney for legal malpractice. The third attorney’s legal malpractice insurer resolved both of these actions through the payment of $1,500,000 to the township officials.
The legal malpractice insurer then sued the Firm’s client and the second attorney for contribution, alleging that they were also negligent in their representation of the business owners. At the close of discovery, summary judgment motions were filed.
The Honorable Petrese B. Tucker granted the Firm’s motion, finding that its client could not be a joint tortfeasor with the third attorney, a requirement for contribution. Judge Tucker also granted summary judgment as to the Firm’s second argument, that its client was not a proximate cause of any harm to the business owners as the subsequent events were not foreseeable. After granting summary judgment for the Firm’s client, Judge Tucker held that summary judgment was also appropriate for the second attorney on the same grounds.
You can read the December 28, 2011 story on this case published in The Legal Intelligencer HERE.
