Defense Verdict on Behalf of Philadelphia Hospital in Wound Care Matter

Marshall L. Schwartz and Lisa J. Peters recently obtained a defense verdict in a medical malpractice case on behalf of a hospital following a four-day jury trial in Philadelphia County.
In December of 2013, the plaintiff was transferred to the critical care unit of defendant hospital for significant pericardial effusion with tamponade physiology. The plaintiff presented with a stage II wound on admission and was discharged with same. Plaintiff’s experts argued that the wound was not properly cared for during admission, resulting in the worsening of the wound and continued treatment subsequent to discharge, including surgical debridement.

The defense maintained that proper care and treatment was provided and that the plaintiffs significant comorbidities, most significantly, end stage renal disease and diabetes, are what contributed to her inability to heal; not the care of the defendants.

After approximately two hours of jury deliberation, the jury found in favor of the defendants.

Defense Verdict on behalf of Podiatrist in Philadelphia County

Heather Hansen and paralegal Beth Carson recently obtained a defense verdict on behalf of a podiatrist in a case involving allegations of failure to timely diagnose melanoma.  The plaintiff brought suit against two podiatrists, his primary care physician, and a vascular surgeon/wound care physician.  The case proceeded to trial against the two podiatrists and the primary care physician, only.

The plaintiff initially presented to his primary care physician with complaints of a pigmented lesion on his right great toe.  He was referred to podiatrist A for further evaluation. Podiatrist A diagnosed a pinched callus which he debrided.  At a follow-up visit, Podiatrist A told the patient that he had a bone spur (seen on x-ray) that was likely contributing to the callus formation.  The patient never returned to Podiatrist A.  For about seven months, plaintiff performed self-care to his wound and kept it covered with a band aid.  He then returned to his PCP because his toe was not healing.  A wound culture was performed and plaintiff was prescribed oral and topical antibiotics.  He was also referred to podiatrist B. 

When plaintiff presented to podiatrist B, he advised that his toe had not healed since being debrided by Podiatrist A and that he had increased pain with elevation.  Podiatrist B examined the toe and described a non-pigmented ulceration.  A MRI was ordered to rule out a possible bone infection and returned negative.  Based on the complaint of pain on elevation, Podiatrist B referred plaintiff to a vascular surgeon to rule out other potential causes of poor wound healing.  Plaintiff never returned to podiatrist B.  Several months later, plaintiff was diagnosed with amelanotic melanoma.

At trial, plaintiff presented expert testimony from specialists in podiatry, family medicine, and oncology.  He argued that each defendant was negligent in failing to perform a biopsy to rule out malignancy or ensure that a biopsy was performed. 

Following a seven-day trial, and over 15 hours of deliberations, the jury returned a verdict finding Podiatrist A 25% negligent, the PCP 25% negligent, and Podiatrist B not negligent.  The jury assessed 50% comparative negligence against plaintiff. 

Defense Verdict on Behalf of Two Cardiologists in Philadelphia County

Marshall L. Schwartz recently obtained a defense verdict on behalf of two cardiologists in a nine-day jury trial involving allegations of a failure to properly monitor a patient’s Coumadin usage following a cardiac catherization, as well as an alleged failure to recognize neurologic signs and symptoms prior to the patient suffering a hemorrhagic stroke.

This case involved a patient who had a longstanding medical history of coronary artery disease, hypertension, diabetes, deep vein thrombosis and pulmonary embolism, and who had undergone gastric bypass surgery multiple times for morbid obesity. He also had been taking Coumadin for several years due to his risk factors for stroke. The patient presented to his cardiologist with symptoms of shortness of breath, and was advised to have a cardiac catherization which was scheduled to take place a few days later. The patient was also instructed to stop taking his Coumadin prior to the procedure. The cardiac catherization was performed without incident, and the patient was instructed to resume taking his Coumadin, follow up with the cardiology practice in a week, and have his Coumadin levels monitored by his primary care provider.

About a week after the patient was discharged from the hospital, he was seen for a follow up appointment with a practitioner at the cardiology practice. The practitioner found that he was neurologically intact. Two days later, he followed up with his primary care provider who historically monitored his Coumadin levels. His blood levels were in range, and he was instructed to continue the same Coumadin dosage that he had been taking since the procedure. Then, about ten later, the patient began to experience symptoms of stroke. His primary care provider ordered an MRI of the brain that revealed a left temporal hemorrhage. Ultimately, the patient was diagnosed with a stroke, however, no surgical intervention was necessary.

The defense successfully argued that although the patient suffered a stroke, it was not the result of any action, or inaction on behalf of anyone in the cardiology practice. In support of this argument, an expert cardiologist and nurse practitioner were called to testify and supported this defense.

After deliberation, the jury returned a unanimous verdict, finding that the defendant physicians’ care and treatment of the plaintiff was not negligent.

Defense Verdict on behalf of Orthopaedic Surgeon

Heather Hansen and paralegal Lexi Romney recently received a defense verdict on behalf of an orthopaedic surgeon in Philadelphia County. A 65-year-old woman presented to the orthopaedic surgeon with knee pain. MRI demonstrated a non-displaced occult fracture of the distal femur. The patient was prescribed a long leg brace, instructed to remain non-weightbearing, and told to follow up with her primary care physician for purposes of anticoagulation to help prevent deep vein thrombosis. The orthopaedic surgeon contacted the patient’s primary care physician about his recommendations. Later the same day, the patient’s primary care physician contacted her on the telephone and discussed the options of using Coumadin or increasing her Aspirin dose from 81mg daily to 325mg daily. The patient chose to increase her dose of Aspirin.

Thereafter, the patient continued to follow up with the orthopaedic surgeon who noted that she was on anticoagulation per her primary care physician. The patient continued to go to work, but despite receiving a walker, she found it too difficult and preferred to use a wheelchair obtained by her husband. She did not tell the orthopaedic surgeon or her primary care physician that she was not using the walker.

Several weeks after her diagnosis, the patient started having nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, sweating and shortness of breath. Eventually, an ambulance was called to her home. After being loaded in the ambulance, the patient became unresponsive and coded. Resuscitative measures were unsuccessful. An autopsy reported the cause of death as pulmonary embolism, deep venous thrombosis, and immobility following femur fracture.

The patient’s husband brought suit against the orthopaedic surgeon and the primary care physician alleging that they were negligent by failing to ensure that adequate anticoagulation and deep vein thrombosis prophylaxis was provided. At trial, plaintiff presented expert witness testimony that Aspirin, an antiplatelet medication, was not standard of care and that an anticoagulant, such as Coumadin, should have been prescribed to the patient. The defense also presented expert witnesses who testified that the use of Aspirin was acceptable for this patient under the guidelines for anticoagulation set forth by the American College of Chest Physicians and the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons. After a seven day trial, the jury found in favor of the defendants.

Defense Verdict on Behalf of Hand Surgeon

Dan RyanCarolyn Bohmueller and paralegal Stacy Jaeger received a defense verdict on behalf of a hand surgeon in Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiff-father and his 11 year old son were involved in a rollover motor vehicle accident, in which the child’s right thumb was partially amputated. The minor was brought to the hospital via helicopter, where his thumb was examined. Following discussions with the parents, and specifically with the child’s father, who was a plastic surgeon, the child was taken to the operating room to address the injury. Plaintiff-father claimed that he did not give consent for a “completion amputation” of the tip of the thumb. At trial, plaintiffs did not pursue their claim that the surgery was improperly performed, and rather only proceeded on a claim of lack of consent. It was established during trial that the distal portion (or end) of the thumb including the first joint had been amputated and injured beyond repair during the accident, and that the plaintiff-father agreed to the surgical procedure performed. After a three day trial, the jury found consent was given for the surgical procedure and returned a verdict in favor of the surgeon.

Defense Verdict on Behalf of Obstetrician

Heather Hansen recently obtained a defense verdict on behalf of an obstetrician in Philadelphia. In this case, Plaintiffs alleged negligence in relation to labor and delivery at a Philadelphia hospital. Plaintiffs claimed that the defendant failed to recognize and interpret the signs and symptoms of placental abruption, failed to diagnose and treat placental abruption, failed to timely respond to signs of fetal distress, and delayed in the performance of a cesarean section. Plaintiff produced an obstetrics and gynecology expert that criticized the time the cesarean section was called, and opined that the delivery should have been called 16 to 18 minutes earlier. The defense maintained that the obstetrical team recognized and responded to the fetal bradycardia immediately, and performed all necessary resuscitative measures in an attempt to regulate the fetal heart rate, before calling an emergent cesarean section. The baby was delivered within ten minutes from the time the attending obstetrician called the emergency cesarean section.

After a three day trial and brief deliberation, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the attending obstetrician.